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Abstract. We presented 3-year-olds with backward blocking and recovery from overshadowing contingencies in the blicket detector task,
a causal induction task that uses binary, deterministic outcomes. Results revealed recovery from overshadowing but no backward blocking. These
results are consistent with recent inferential and computational models of causal learning and induction. Our findings extend and clarify recent
reports of retrospective revaluation in 3- and 4-year-olds (Sobel, D. M., Tenenbaum, J. B., & Gopnik, A. (2004). Children’s causal inferences
from indirect evidence: Backwards blocking and Bayesian reasoning in preschoolers. Cognitive Science, 28, 303–333), and underscore the
sophistication of causal induction processes in young children.
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People exhibit a remarkable capability at discovering causal
relationships among events that occur in their environments.
In a sense, that is not surprising, as this capacity allows one
to anticipate future states of the world (e.g., a likely attempt
at retaliation from one’s neighbour at the bar) on the basis of
current conditions (e.g., one being flirted with by the partner
of one’s neighbour), so that one can try to prevent this future
state of affairs from happening (e.g., by acting uninterested)
or anticipate to cope with it (e.g., by flexing one’s muscles).
It is obvious that such a capacity is crucial for one’s social
and physical survival. Consequently, the processes and prin-
ciples that underlie the human capacity for causal learning
and induction have been and continue to be a topic of much
interest and intense debate in philosophy, psychology, and
cognitive science (e.g., Cheng, 1997; De Houwer &
Beckers, 2002; Gopnik et al., 2004; Hume, 1739/1987;
Kant, 1781/1965; Michotte, 1954; Pearl, 2000).
In recent years, much of the debate in the psychology of
causal learning has centred around the question towhat extent
human causal learning relies on low-level associative
processes, as embodied in the Rescorla-Wagner model
(Rescorla &Wagner, 1972) and related models (e.g., Dickin-
son & Burke, 1996; Van Hamme&Wasserman, 1994), or on
more sophisticated inferential reasoning processes, such as
those represented by Causal Model Theory (Waldmann,
1996) and computational models of causal learning (e.g.,
Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005). Much of the input in this
debate has come from studies on cue competition in human
causal learning. Cue competition refers to the observation that
the causal status of a cueB in producing a given outcomeO is
not only determined by the degree of co-occurrence of that
particular cue with the outcome under consideration, but also
by the degree of co-occurrence of certain other cues with the
outcome. For instance, blocking, one of the most intensely
studied cue competition phenomena, entails the observation
that the causal status of cue B, which is paired with the out-
come in compound with another cue A (denoted as AB !
O), will be reduced if A on itself is also paired with the out-
come (denoted as A ! O) either before the AB ! O pair-
ings (forward blocking) or after the AB ! O pairings
(backward blocking, a form of retrospective revaluation).
Other forms of cue competition include overshadowing, in
which the causal status of cue B is judged to be less if it is
paired with the outcome in combination with another cue A
(AB ! O) than if it is pairedwith the outcomeon itself (B !
O), and unovershadowing, in which the causal status of B is
increased if compounded parings of A and B with the out-
come are accompanied by presentations of Awithout the out-
come (A ! noO), either before the AB ! O pairings
(protection from overshadowing) or thereafter (recovery from
overshadowing, which like backward blocking is an instance
of retrospective revaluation).
Awealth of research indicates that the occurrence of cue
competition in human causal learning is sensitive to con-
straints of normative causal induction in a way that fits nat-
urally with recent computational and inferential models of
causal learning, but is at variance with core assumptions
of associative models of causal learning (e.g., Beckers,
De Houwer, Pinen˜o, & Miller, 2005; De Houwer,
Beckers, & Glautier, 2002; Vandorpe, De Houwer, &
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Beckers, 2007; but see Le Pelley, Oakshott, & McLaren,
2005).1 One particularly relevant set of evidence for the
present purposes comes from studies showing that the
occurrence of blocking is crucially dependent on the avail-
ability of sufficient working memory resources
(De Houwer & Beckers, 2003; Vandorpe, De Houwer, &
Beckers, 2005; Waldmann & Walker, 2005), in line with
the idea that the reduced causal strength estimate that
constitutes blocking is arrived at through effortful inferential
reasoning processes.
In the context of the debate between associative and infer-
ential models of causal learning, recently, attention has been
devoted to the study of cue competition in causal learning
and induction in children (e.g., Beckers, Van den Broeck,
et al., 2005; Sobel, Tenenbaum, & Gopnik, 2004; Waldmann
& Weber, submitted for publication; see also Gopnik et al.,
2004). If blocking and other cue competition phenomena
rely in part on effortful inferential reasoning processes
(e.g., De Houwer & Beckers, 2003) and insight in causal
mechanisms (e.g., De Houwer et al., 2002; Waldmann &
Holyoak, 1992), one might perhaps expect that blocking
would be less likely to occur in preschool children, who
presumably possess less working memory capacity (e.g.,
Luciana & Nelson, 1998), and have been claimed to lack
true understanding of causal mechanism (e.g., Schlottmann,
2001). Alternatively, blocking, if it occurs in preschool
children, might reflect the operation of simple associative
processes, rather than sophisticated causal induction
processes, and thus be less sensitive to normative constraints
of causal induction.
Most of the limited evidence that is presently available
seems to support inferential models. Waldmann and Weber
(submitted for publication), for instance, in a causal learning
study comprising different age groups, observed that cue
competition only occurred in participants of 7 years of age
and beyond; when it did, it was sensitive to the causal struc-
ture of the task. Beckers, Van den Broeck, et al. (2005) pre-
sented 4- and 8-year-old children with a contingency
learning task, which was embedded in either a causal or a
predictive scenario. In this task, the children were asked to
predict the degree of rain depicted on the back of a card,
on the basis of coloured symbols on the front of it. Half
of the children were told that the coloured symbols repre-
sented buttons on a machine that could produce rain (causal
scenario), whereas the other half of the children were told
that the symbols represented indicators on a machine that
could predict rain (predictive scenario). In line with Causal
Model Theory and inferential reasoning models of causal
learning, blocking occurred only in the causal scenario,
and not in the predictive scenario. Importantly, unlike in
the study by Waldmann and Weber (submitted for publica-
tion), there was no effect of age group, suggesting that
blocking does occur in preschool children if probed with a
task that is sufficiently intuitive and appealing to them,
and that children can exhibit rather sophisticated causal
induction capabilities even at age four.
Finally, Sobel et al. (2004, Experiments 1–2) obtained
evidence for cue competition in 3- and 4-year-old children,
using a blicket detector task. In this task, children were pre-
sented with blocks of various shapes and colours, which
when placed on the blicket detector (a wooden box) could
make the machine buzz and light up (in which case the
block is a blicket) or not (in which case the block is not a
blicket). They first presented the children with two blocks
(say A and B) that, when placed on the machine together,
made it go off. Afterwards, block A was placed on the
machine on itself and this made the machine either go off
or not. Crucially, children’s judgement of whether block
B, which was never placed on the machine on itself, was
a blicket, was significantly affected by the causal status of
A, such that the children judged B less likely to be a blicket
if A was a blicket than if A was not a blicket.
Sobel et al. (2004) describe their findings as evidence for
backward blocking and recovery from overshadowing
(which they term ‘‘indirect screening off’’). However, it is
actually unclear whether their results reflect only backward
blocking, only recovery from overshadowing, or both. That
is, the difference in causal status of B between the backward
blocking and the recovery from overshadowing conditions
may have been due to the A ! O trials decreasing the cau-
sal status of B below what it would have been without the
A ! O trials (backward blocking), the A! noO trials
increasing it above what it would have been without the
additional A-only trials (recovery from overshadowing), or
both. In the absence of a control condition, in which A is
not placed on the blicket detector on itself, this is not
amenable to evaluation. This issue is not without impor-
tance, though. Although Sobel et al. interpret their results
as favouring a normative Bayesian structure learning ac-
count of causal induction, most normative models of
causal induction would not actually anticipate backward
blocking to occur in the task that was employed. For
instance, according to the power PC model (Cheng,
1997), if a binary outcome always occurs when either A
and B are present or A is present alone, the causal status
of B cannot be determined. In other words, the A ! O trials
do not help to clarify the causal status of B. However,
unlike A ! O trials, presentation of A ! noO trials should
help to disambiguate (i.e., increase) the causal status of B. In
other words, according to the power PC model (or any
computational model of causal learning that incorporates a
Noisy-OR parameterisation, e.g., Griffiths & Tenenbaum,
2005), in the blicket detector task as used by Sobel et al.
(2004, Experiments 1–2), recovery from overshadowing
rather than backward blocking should be responsible for
the retrospective revaluation that is observed.
In contrast, associative models of causal learning would
have no problem accounting for the occurrence of backward
blocking in this task. For example, according to the revised
Rescorla-Wagner model (Van Hamme &Wasserman, 1994),
presentation of A-only trials after AB! O trials will result
in changes of the causal status of B because of the fact that
1 In fact, recent evidence suggests that also nonhuman learning may in whole or in part be attributed to the operation of inferential reasoning
processes. For instance, the appearance of forward blocking in Pavlovian conditioning in rats seems to be sensitive to constraints of causal
inference, such as outcome maximality (e.g., Beckers, Miller, De Houwer, & Urushihara, 2006).
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the presentation of A activates the representation of B
through the A-B association established on the AB ! O
trials. As a result, the causal status of B will change in a
direction opposite to the change in the causal status of A.
In the case of A ! O trials, the causal status of A will go
up and the causal status of B will go down; similarly, in
the case of A ! noO trials, the causal status of A will go
down and the causal status of B will go up. So, according
to such models, backward blocking will occur under the
same circumstances that recovery from overshadowing
occurs under, and vice versa, because they are assumed to
be symmetrical results of the same basic learning algorithm.
In causal learning in adults, unovershadowing is typi-
cally much stronger than blocking (Vandorpe & De Houwer,
2005). Also, recovery from overshadowing has been shown
not to be sensitive to the same constraints of causal
induction as is the case for backward blocking (Beckers,
De Houwer, et al., 2005, Experiment 3; Lovibond, Been,
Mitchell, Bouton, & Frohardt, 2003). This suggests that
backward blocking and recovery from overshadowing are
not (always) symmetrical outcomes of the same learning
mechanism. More specifically, for human adults as well as
rats, evidence suggests that subjects are sensitive to the fact
that outcome maximality obscures the causal status of a
blocked cue B in a blocking design that includes appropriate
controls (Beckers, De Houwer, et al., 2005; Beckers, Miller,
De Houwer, & Urushihara, 2006).
The aim of the work reported here was to establish to
what degree the retrospective revaluation that 3-year-olds
display in the blicket detector task is driven by backward
blocking, recovery from overshadowing, or both. If causal
induction in such young children relies on more basic
associative principles than it seems to do in adult humans
(e.g., Schlottmann, 2001), one could anticipate both to
contribute equally to retrospective revaluation. However, if
3-year-old children’s causal learning reflects fairly sophisti-
cated causal induction capabilities (e.g., Beckers, Van den
Broeck, et al., 2005), one should expect retrospective reval-
uation in this task to be driven by recovery from overshad-
owing only.
To test these alternatives, we adapted the blicket detector
task used by Sobel et al. (2004), including trials on which
two blocks C and D were placed on the detector and resulted
in activation of the machine, and without presenting trials on
which only C or D would be placed on the machine (see
Table 1). This way, judgements for C can serve as a compar-
ison to evaluate the effect of A ! O and A ! noO trials
on judgements for B. So, in some series of trials, children
saw the blicket detector getting activated when A and B
were placed on the machine together, when C and D were
placed on the machine together, and when A was placed
on the machine alone, whereas it did not get activated when
another block E was placed on the machine alone (backward
blocking condition). Afterwards, they were asked about A,
B, and C whether or not each was a blicket, and were asked
whether they would choose either B or C if they wanted to
activate the machine. A backward blocking effect would be
evident if B was judged less often to be a blicket than C, and
if children preferred C over B to make the machine activate.
In other series of trials, the children were asked the same
questions after seeing the blicket detector getting activated
when A and B were placed on the machine together, when
C and D were placed on the machine together, and when E
was placed on the machine alone, whereas it did not activate
when A was placed on the machine alone (recovery from
overshadowing condition). A recovery from overshadowing
effect would imply that they judged B more often to be a
blicket than C, and if they preferred B over C when asked
to activate the machine.
Method
Participants
Forty-seven children (20 girls, 27 boys) with a mean age of
40 months (ranging from 34 to 46 months of age) partici-
pated in the experiment. They were recruited from a kinder-
garten in the city of Leuven. Written informed consent was
obtained from the children’s parents before the start of the
study; the children gave oral consent right before
participating.
Stimuli and Materials
For the pretest, two identical yellow plastic bars and two
identical transparent plastic cubes were used. For the actual
experiment, 30 wooden blocks were used, all different in
colour and shape.
The blicket detector was constructed after the device
used by Sobel et al. (2004). It was a wooden box,
24 · 16 · 8 cm (l · w · h), with a semi-transparent grey
plastic top. An electrical cord with a power switch came
out of one side of the box. The box contained pressure-
sensitive sensors underneath the plastic top, such that when
the power switch was on and a block was placed on the
device, a bell would sound and the plastic top of the box
would light up. The box was placed on top of a table,
between the child and the experimenter, such that the child
could not see the electrical cord coming out of the device
and the experimenter could easily control the power switch
out of sight of the child.
Table 1. Design of the experiment
Condition Trials
Backward blocking AB+ CD+ E! A+
Recovery from overshadowing AB+ CD+ E+ A!
Control A+ E!
Note. A, B, C, D, and E represent blocks of different shapes and
colours; ‘‘+’’ indicates activation of the blicket machine, ‘‘!’’
indicates no activation of the blicket machine. The trial series
was repeated twice in each condition. The backward blocking
and recovery from overshadowing conditions were presented
twice, the control condition once to every participant, using new
blocks each time, in a semi-random order. See main text for
further details.
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Procedure
The experiment consisted of a pretest, a training phase, and
an experimental phase that contained five conditions.
The pretest was conducted to see whether the children
were capable of learning new categories of objects. They
were presented with the yellow bars and the transparent
cubes, after which the experimenter picked one of the
objects and said it was a ‘‘flop’’. The child was then asked
whether it could give the experimenter the other flop. This
routine was repeated with a different object, which was
called a ‘‘dap’’ by the experimenter. If the child pointed to
the object identical to the one picked up by the experimenter
on both trials, testing proceeded to the next phase; if not, the
experiment would be aborted. All children passed the
pretest.
In the training phase, the blicket detector (called ‘‘fonkel
machine’’ in Dutch) was introduced to the children. They
were shown a basket with the blocks, and given the follow-
ing instructions (translated from Dutch): ‘‘Here is a blicket
machine, and a bunch of blocks. Some of these blocks are
blickets (‘fonkels’) and some are just regular blocks. We
don’t know which ones are blickets and which ones are
not. To find out which blocks are blickets, we use the blicket
machine. You can place one or more blocks on the machine,
and the machine tells us when there is a blicket on it by
lighting up and making a sound. Look.’’ The functioning
of the machine was then demonstrated by the experimenter
by placing one block on the machine that made the machine
go, and then placing one block on the machine that did not
make it go. The experimenter then tested whether the child
had understood the instructions, by placing one block on the
machine that made it go and one block that did not make it
go, one after the other in random order, and afterwards ask-
ing the child which block was a blicket. This was repeated,
using new blocks each time, until the child identified the
correct block as a blicket three times in a row.
In the experimental phase, all children were presented
with five series of trials. In two backward blocking series,
the children were first shown that two blocks (A and B),
when placed on the machine together, made it go, as did
two different blocks (C and D). Then another block (E)
was placed on the machine on itself and did not make the
machine go. Finally, block A was placed on the machine
on itself and did make the machine go. After that, the whole
sequence of trials was repeated, in the same order. The two
recovery from overshadowing series were identical to the
backward blocking series, except for the fact that block E
now did make the machine go on itself, whereas A did
not. In the control series, one block that was placed on
the machine on itself did make it go on both trials, whereas
another one never did. The five series were presented in a
new random order for each child, with the restriction that
the control series was never presented first. New blocks
were used for each series, so that a child never saw the same
block in different series. At the end of each backward block-
ing and recovery from overshadowing series, after the
sequence of trials was presented, the children were first
asked which block they would pick to make the machine
go when given the choice between blocks B and C, and
then, without feedback concerning the first question, they
were asked whether or not each of blocks A, B, and C
was a blicket. At the end of the control series, they were
merely asked whether A was a blicket and whether B was
a blicket. The control condition simply served to check
whether children still knew that a block that made the
machine go was a blicket and one that did not was not.
Two children (both boys) failed this test; their data were
excluded from the analyses, leaving 45 children in the final
sample.
Results
For each of the two conditions (backward blocking and
recovery from overshadowing), we recorded how often the
children labelled each of the blocks A, B, and C as blickets,
and how often they picked B or C to make the blicket
machine go.
Figure 1 depicts the number of times each block was
labelled a blicket, by condition (note that both conditions
were presented twice, so the number ranges from 0 to 2).
Block A was labelled a blicket more often in the backward
blocking condition than in the recovery from overshadowing
condition, as confirmed by a Wilcoxon signed ranks test,
z = 5.65, p < .01, indicating that the children did register
the fact that Awas followed by the outcome in the blocking
conditions but not in the recovery from overshadowing con-
ditions. Nevertheless, in neither the recovery from overshad-
owing nor the backward blocking condition did the number
of times B was labelled a blicket differ from the number of
times C was labelled a blicket, z = 1, p = .32, and z = 0,
p = 1, respectively.
Figure 2 depicts the relative number of times the children
picked B or C to make the machine go in the forced-choice
test in each condition (again, the preference score for each
block ranges from 0 to 2). In the backward blocking condi-
tion, the numbers of children that chose block B over block
C never, once, or twice did not deviate from chance as
Figure 1. Mean number of times blocks were labelled as
blickets after the backward blocking and after the recovery
from overshadowing series. Error bars represent standard
errors of the means.
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assessed by a Chi-square test calculated against a binomial
distribution, v2(2) = 4.16, p = .13. In the recovery from
overshadowing condition the children clearly preferred
block B over block C, v2(2) = 22.78, p < .01. Accordingly,
a Wilcoxon signed ranks test revealed that the children
picked block B rather than block C more often in the
recovery from overshadowing condition than in the back-
ward blocking condition, z = 2.29, p < .05.
Discussion
The children labelled blocks B and C as blickets equally
often, both after the backward blocking and the recovery
from overshadowing series. However, when forced to
choose between B and C to make the machine go, they
clearly preferred B over C after the recovery from overshad-
owing series, but did not prefer C over B after the backward
blocking series. The lack of difference between how often B
and C were labelled blickets in the recovery from overshad-
owing condition cannot be interpreted because of the pres-
ence of a ceiling effect. Given that the children already
tended to always label block C as a blicket, there was no
room for the A ! noO trials to increase the likelihood that
B would be labelled a blicket. In contrast, there was clearly
ample room for the A ! O presentations in the backward
blocking condition to reduce the likelihood that B would
be labelled a blicket, which it did not. Therefore, while
the labelling data are inconclusive with regard to the pres-
ence of recovery from overshadowing, they do suggest that
backward blocking did not occur. The choice data offer a
more conclusive picture. When forced to choose, the chil-
dren clearly prefer B over C in order to make the machine
go in the recovery from overshadowing series, indicating
that the A ! noO presentations affected children’s causal
inferences. In the backward blocking condition, the children
are indifferent between B and C when asked to make the
machine go, suggesting that the A ! O trials did not
influence the causal status of B, which again implies that
backward blocking did not occur. In sum, then, the present
data indicate that the retrospective revaluation observed by
Sobel et al. (2004) was due to recovery from overshadow-
ing, and not due to backward blocking.
Note that even though our results are at variance with
how Sobel et al. (2004) describe their results (i.e., as
backward blocking), they are in fact completely consistent
with their theoretical position and framework. Indeed, the
fact that children exhibit understanding of the causal ambi-
guity of a blocked cue in case of a deterministic, binary out-
come is perfectly compatible with Bayesian models of
causal induction that implement a Noisy-OR logic (e.g.,
Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005). While the original results
reported by Sobel et al. did not exclude an associative expla-
nation (see Sobel et al., 2004, p. 303), the results we report
here seem at variance with existing associative learning
models. As such, our results supplement and clarify rather
than contradict the results reported by Sobel and colleagues.
In this respect, it is interesting to note that in general, the
3-year-olds seemed more likely to label blocks as blickets
in our experiment than in the Sobel et al. study. A likely
reason for this is that, due to the addition of the CD ! O
trials, activation of the blicket detector was relatively more
frequent than in the original study. This may well have
increased the subjective a priori likelihood that blocks would
be blickets. This observation is consistent with the observa-
tion that the likelihood that blocks will be labelled blickets
and the degree of retrospective revaluation is affected by
instructions and demonstrations that affect the perceived
relative frequency of blickets (see Sobel et al., 2004,
Experiment 3).
So, just as is the case for prevention from overshadowing
versus forward blocking in adult causal learning (Vandorpe
& De Houwer, 2005), recovery from overshadowing seems
to emerge much more readily than backward blocking in
3-year-old children, as one would normatively expect. This
observation adds to the considerable complexity of causal
induction processes in preschoolers observed in previous
cue-competition research (Beckers, Van den Broeck, et al.,
2005). This is all the more remarkable because at this age,
children have not yet received any formal training in the
laws of physical causality. It suggests that the initial devel-
opment of the machinery for sophisticated causal inference
does not require formal instruction, but can be triggered
by mere interaction with the causal world.
Acknowledgements
We thank Alison Gopnik and Tom Griffiths for helpful dis-
cussions concerning the research reported in this manuscript.
References
Beckers, T., De Houwer, J., Pinen˜o, O., & Miller, R. R. (2005).
Outcome additivity and outcome maximality influence cue
competition in human causal learning. Journal of Experi-
Figure 2. Mean number of times children picked block B
or C to make the blicket detector go in the forced-choice
test after the backward blocking and after the recovery
from overshadowing series. Error bars represent standard
errors of the means.
Beckers et al.: Causal Learning in Children 31
! 2009 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers Experimental Psychology 2009; Vol. 56(1):27–32
mental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 31,
238–249.
Beckers, T., Miller, R. R., De Houwer, J., & Urushihara, K.
(2006). Reasoning rats: Forward blocking in Pavlovian
animal conditioning is sensitive to constraints of causal
inference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,
135, 92–102.
Beckers, T., Van den Broeck, U., Renne, M., Vandorpe, S., De
Houwer, J., & Eelen, P. (2005). Blocking is sensitive to
causal structure in 4-year-old and 8-year-old children.
Experimental Psychology, 52, 264–271.
Cheng, P. W. (1997). From covariation to causation: A causal
power theory. Psychological Review, 104, 367–405.
De Houwer, J., & Beckers, T. (2002). A review of recent
developments in research and theories on human contingency
learning. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology,
55B, 289–310.
De Houwer, J., & Beckers, T. (2003). Secondary task difficulty
modulates forward blocking in human contingency learning.
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 56B,
345–357.
De Houwer, J., Beckers, T., & Glautier, S. (2002). Outcome and
cue properties modulate blocking. Quarterly Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 55A, 965–985.
Dickinson, A., & Burke, J. (1996). Within-compound associa-
tions mediate the retrospective revaluation of causality
judgements. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology,
49B, 60–80.
Gopnik, A., Glymour, C., Sobel, D. M., Schulz, L. E., Kushnir,
T., & Danks, D. (2004). A theory of causal learning in
children: Causal maps and Bayes nets. Psychological Review,
111, 1–30.
Griffiths, T. L., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2005). Structure and
strength in causal induction. Cognitive Psychology, 51,
334–384.
Hume, D. (1987). A treatise of human nature (2nd ed.).
Oxford, England: Clarendon Press (Original work pub-
lished 1739).
Kant, I. (1965). Critique of pure reason. London: Macmillan
(Original work published 1781).
Le Pelley, M. E., Oakeshott, S. M., & McLaren, I. P. L. (2005).
Blocking and unblocking in human causal learning. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 31,
56–70.
Lovibond, P. F., Been, S.-L., Mitchell, C. J., Bouton, M. E., &
Frohardt, R. (2003). Forward and backward blocking of
causal judgement is enhanced by additivity of effect mag-
nitude. Memory & Cognition, 31, 133–142.
Luciana, M., & Nelson, C. A. (1998). The functional emergence
of prefrontally-guided working memory systems in four- to
eight-year-old children. Neuropsychologia, 36, 273–293.
Michotte, A. (1954). La perception de la causalite´. Leuven:
Publications Universitaires de Louvain.
Pearl, J. (2000). Causality: Models, reasoning, and inference.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Rescorla, R. A., & Wagner, A. R. (1972). A theory of Pavlovian
conditioning: Variations in the effectiveness of reinforcement
and nonreinforcement. In A. H. Black, & W. F. Prokasy
(Eds.), Classical conditioning II: Current research and
theory (pp. 64–99). New York: Appleton.
Schlottmann, A. (2001). Perception versus knowledge of cause
and effect in children: When seeing is believing. Current
Directions in Psychological Science, 10, 111–115.
Sobel, D. M., Tenenbaum, J. B., & Gopnik, A. (2004). Children’s
causal inferences from indirect evidence: Backwards block-
ing and Bayesian reasoning in preschoolers. Cognitive
Science, 28, 303–333.
Vandorpe, S., & De Houwer, J. (2005). A comparison of
forward blocking and reduced overshadowing in human
causal learning. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 12,
945–949.
Vandorpe, S., De Houwer, J., & Beckers, T. (2005). Further
evidence for the role of inferential reasoning in forward
blocking. Memory & Cognition, 33, 1047–1056.
Vandorpe, S., De Houwer, J., & Beckers, T. (2007). Outcome
maximality and additivity training also influence cue com-
petition in causal learning when learning involves many cues
and events. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology,
60, 356–368.
Van Hamme, L. J., & Wasserman, E. A. (1994). Cue competition
in causality judgements: The role of nonpresentation of
compound stimulus elements. Learning & Motivation, 25,
127–151.
Waldmann, M. R. (1996). Knowledge-based causal induction. In
D. R. Shanks, K. J. Holyoak, & D. L. Medin (Eds.), The
psychology of learning and motivation, Vol. 34: Causal
learning (pp. 47–88). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Waldmann, M. R., & Holyoak, K. J. (1992). Predictive and
diagnostic learning within causal models: Asymmetries in
cue competition. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General, 121, 222–236.
Waldmann, M. R., & Walker, J. M. (2005). Competence and
performance in causal learning. Learning & Behavior, 33,
211–229.
Waldmann, M. R., & Weber, A. (submitted for publication).
Children’s sensitivity to structural implications of causal
models.
Received September 15, 2007
Revision received November 20, 2007
Accepted November 21, 2007
Tom Beckers
Department of Psychology
University of Amsterdam
Roetersstraat 15
1018 WB Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Tel. +31 20 525 6768
Fax +31 20 639 1369
E-mail T.R.J.Beckers@uva.nl
32 Beckers et al.: Causal Learning in Children
Experimental Psychology 2009; Vol. 56(1):27–32 ! 2009 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
